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Rewriting the 1934
Communications Act, 1976-1980:
A Case Study of the Formulation
of Communications Policy*
By ERWIN G. KRASNOW**
HERBERT A. TERRY***
LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY****
Forty-two years after the Communications Act was signed into
law, Representative Lionel Van Deerlin (D-Calif.) proposed a
"basement to attic" rewrite of the Act. Such thinking was regarded
as heretical on Capitol Hill-it had taken the Congress seven years
to rewrite the Radio Act of 1927 and fifteen years to replace the
Copyright Act of 1909. Many of Van Deerlin's colleagues likened
the quest for a rewrite of the Communications Act to tilting at
windmills. A senior member of the House Communications Sub-
committee characterized rewrite legislation as "the equivalent of a
20-course meal, one that would be indigestible if the courses were
presented too quickly, or one that would take 10 years to eat if
each course were cooked to perfection by the very capable kitchen
staff."'
Three years after the rewrite idea was first advanced by Van
Deerlin, the legislation was scuttled by the House Communications
Subcommittee. Variety, in an article headlined "Reality Catches
Up With Van Deerlin," made the following observation on Van
* Adapted from material in E. KRASNOW, H. TERRY, & L. LONGLEY, PoLITIcs O
BROADCAST REGULATION (3d ed. 1982), soon to be published by St. Martin's Press, New
York, NY.
** Senior Vice President and General Counsel, National Association of Broadcasters,
Washington D.C.
*** Assistant Professor of Telecommunications, Indiana University, Bloomington,
Indiana.
**** Associate Professor of Government, Lawrence University, Appleton, Wisconsin.
1. The Communications Act of 1978, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Communica-
tions, House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, on H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., Vol. II, Part I 358 (1978) (Statement of Representative John M. Murphy (D-N.Y.)).
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Deerlin's quixotic project: "Amending the 1934 Communications
Act from scratch, and overturning the legal precedent that method
entails, obviously will not be bought by Congress, no matter how
much technology has antiquated the law."2 Contrary to Variety's
assessment, however, the rewrite process was in many respects a
sweeping victory for the proponents of change. As will be shown,
numerous fundamental principles underlying the rewrite effort
were embodied in landmark FCC policy decisions and set the
agenda for a national debate on communications policy. Largely
because of Van Deerlin's efforts, communications issues in the late
1970's took on a new acceptance and higher priority.
Background for the Rewrite Efforts
On April 27, 1976, Van Deerlin was unanimously elected Chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Communications by the Democratic
caucus of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce. The week before, Representative Torbert H. Macdonald
(D-Mass.) had resigned as Chairman because of poor health and
endorsed Van Deerlin as his successor. Van Deerlin, who credited
Macdonald's endorsement for his unanimous selection, announced
that all memberes of Macdonald's Subcommittee staff, including
its counsel, Harry M. Shooshan, III, had agreed to stay on.' He
also promised to continue the projects Macdonald had instituted,
particularly the scheduling of 15 days of planned hearings on cable
television.
Van Deerlin, in order to chair the Communications Subcommit-
tee, had to give up the chairmanship of the Subcommittee on Con-
sumer Protection and Finance. It was not a difficult decision for
him; he observed that being with broadcasters was going to be a lot
more fun than being with manufacturing chemists.5 In a strong
campaign for Chairmanship, he let his colleagues know he was the
"man for the job."' His qualifications were indeed unique-he had
served on the Communications Subcommittee during 10 of his 14
years in Congress. Prior to his election to Congress in 1962, he
2. Variety, July 18, 1979 at 29, col. 4.
3. Macdonald Retirement Changes the Line-Up, BROADCASTING, May 3, 1976, at 42. See
also, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, DEREGULATION OF CABLE TELEVISION (1977).
4. Id.
5. Van Deerlin: Making a Difference, BROADCASTING, May 7, 1979, at 46.
6. The Communications Act: Broadcasters' Bogeyman, MEDIA DECISIONS, August, 1977,
at 60.
[Vol. 3346
REWRITING THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
served as a news director and anchorman for KSFD AM-TV in San
Diego and KETV, Tijuana, Mexico, and as city editor of the San
Diego Journal. Since Van Deerlin's home town is San Diego, the
site of one of the largest cable systems in the nation, he had fol-
lowed closely the development of the cable industry.
Three weeks after being elected Chairman, Van Deerlin presided
at the first of a series of oversight hearings on cable television reg-
ulation. On the first day of the hearing, he announced that the
Subcommittee would be taking a comprehensive look at cable tele-
vision. Perhaps the first public glimmer of the intention of the
Subcommittee to undertake a much more ambitious mission-a
full review of the Communications Act-came at a cable hearing
held on July 28, 1976, when Representative Louis Frey, Jr. (R-
Fla.), the Subcommittee's ranking minority member, commented:
"For sometime I have been echoing what [Representative Van
Deerlin has] said about the need to look at this entire Communica-
tions Act of 1934 in view of where we are going in the new technol-
ogy, and it becomes apparent when you push in one place it pops
out in some place else, and you put a Band-Aid on it."7
Common carrier issues, not cable or broadcast, were highest on
the Subcommittee's political agenda during Van Deerlin's first few
months as Chairman. In a move characterized by Business Week
as American Telephone & Telegraph Company's "most daring po-
litical power play since the passage of the Communications Act of
1934,"s AT&T launched a multi-million dollar lobbying effort to
obtain passage of the Consumer Communications Reform Act of
1976, commonly known as the "Bell Bill." The bill responded to
FCC decisions allowing increased competition in the telephone in-
dustry. The Bell Bill would have transferred to the states the
power to regulate the use of new telephone equipment and would
have increased the legal burden that an AT&T competitor had to
7. Cable Television Regulation Oversight, Part 2, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 945 (1976). Frey was not in attendance at the first day of hearings (May 17, 1976) but
inserted a statement in the official record. Torbert Macdonald, a year earlier, had com-
mented that the Communications Act "is the product of a time when telecommunications
technology was in a relatively primitive stage," and felt the time was ripe for a reexamina-
tion of the entire Act. Because of the poor state of his health, he did not try to undertake
such an ambitious prospect. Macdonald Wants a Tether on FCC, [and] Some Fat Trim-
ming, BROADCASTING, June 23, 1975, at 32. However, the Subcommittee's 1976 budget justifi-
cation, drafted by Shooshan, continues with the following phrase: "The subcommittee in-
tends to undertake the redrafting of the Communications Act of 1934."
8. AT&T's Bold Bid to Stifle Competitors, BUSINESS WEEK, March 15, 1976, at 82.
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meet before being licensed by the Commission to offer private line
services. Some observers regarded the bill as designed to force
Congress to focus on an extreme proposition, thereby assuring that
the policy debate would be a reaction to AT&T's agenda rather
than a following of the FCC's pro-competitive stance on common
carrier issues.9 Nearly 200 Senators and Representatives sponsored
the "Bell Bill" in the 94th Congress, prompting Representative
Tim Wirth (D-Colo.), a member of the Communications Subcom-
mittee, to comment: when "better than 40% of the House cospon-
sors any bill, it's either a damn good piece of legislation or some-
body's exerting an awful lot of pressure."10
Van Deerlin opposed the Bell Bill, stating that "a lot of people
are waking up to the fact that under this bill, many who now have
a choice of carrier would be at the mercy of a single source."" Lou
Frey and several other members of the Communications Subcom-
mittee shared Van Deerlin's concern. Van Deerlin and Frey de-
cided to voice their concern in what would prove to be a most am-
bitious project. In an action characterized by Theodore B. Merrill,
Jr., writing in Business Week, as "a bold, strategic move," they
instructed the Subcommittee staff to examine the Bell Bill in the
context of a review of the entire Communications Act.'2 If all in-
dustry segments were involved, Van Deerlin reasoned, the lobbies
would tend to balance each other in hearings and debates.
On August 6, 1976, the day after the last Subcommittee hearing
on cable, Van Deerlin announced that a prime undertaking in the
95th Congress should be a "basement-to-penthouse revamping of
the 1934 Act."' 8 He said that Lou Frey agreed with the need for a
review of the 1934 Act-written when the only mass medium of
electronic communications was radio-adding that the idea of re-
vising the nation's basic communications law had been gaining
popularity: "Everybody's saying it now." He referred to a speech in
June by Jimmy Carter, then the Democratic Presidential candi-
9. Sirico, House Trading with Ma Bell: Who Benefits?, in TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY
AND THE CITIZEN 225 (1979).
10. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS, Sept. 20, 1976, at 3.
11. NCTA to Oppose Bell Bill, TELEVISION DIGEST, Sept. 6, 1976, at 4.
12. A Slick, Thoughtful Overhaul of the Communications Industry, BUSINESS WEEK, July
10, 1978, at 86.
13. Rewrite of. Communications Act Serious Subject on Hill, BROADCASTING, August 9,
1976 at 19. Van Deerlin quickly abandoned the "basement-to-penthouse" phrase in favor of
"basement-to-attic."
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date, calling for a review of the entire Act.' 4 According to Van
Deerlin, he and members of the Subcommittee staff had devised
the idea of a possible rewrite after recognizing that there were
many contending forces pushing for legislation on a piecemeal
basis:
We have so many competing interests in various directions.
The urge among broadcasters is for some kind of license-renewal
legislation. You have the feeling of the cable industry that it's got
to have some relief from the 1972 rules. There is the push by the
telephone company for legislation that goes right to the heart of
what a regulated common carrier should be.
And at the end of every political campaign, you have the push
for some reform of equal time and the Fairness Doctrine rules
that the Commission evolved from Section 315.
It just seemed to me, and to Congressman Frey, who put it suc-
cinctly when he said: "We've just been putting Band-Aid on top
of Band-Aid for so long," that maybe it's time to go back and
think of it more basically.
[The Communications Act was enacted] at a time before com-
mercial television, before coaxial cable, before satellites, before
microwaves or optical fibers or laser beams or any of those
things."
Van Deerlin hoped to derail the Bell Bill with his rewrite pro-
ject. He also wanted to achieve four broad substantive goals. First,
as a former newsman intensely dedicated to the preservation of
journalistic freedom, he sought the repeal of section 315 (equal op-
portunity) and the elimination of the Fairness Doctrine and other
governmental restrictions on broadcast programming. "If Thomas
Jefferson were writing the Bill of Rights today," Van Deerlin often
stated, "he would make it clear that the First Amendment applies
to broadcast as well as print journalism."" Second, spurred by a
populist antipathy to bigness and monopoly, he supported open
entry and greater economic efficiency in the common carrier indus-
try. Third, as a Congressman from a district with the nation's larg-
est cable system, he advocated deregulation of the cable industry.
14. Id.
15. Abrams, Inside the FCC, TELEVISION/RADIO AGE, Jan. 3, 1977, at 83. According to
Representative Tim Wirth, an early supporter of the rewrite concept, the impetus for review
was occasioned by the inability of the 1934 Act to embrace developments in technology,
"new blood" on the House and Senate Communications Subcommittees, and pressure from
the cable and telephone industries. TELEVISION DIGEST, Sept. 20, 1976, at 6.
16. Mass Media Laws, Changes Proposed, Washington Post, March 30, 1979, at D2, col.
1.
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Fourth, he sought deregulation of radio and television accompa-
nied by the creation of new outlets to achieve greater diversity of
programming sources. A basic tenet of Van Deerlin's philosophy
was that true competition would decrease the need for government
regulation and-with respect to the common carrier indus-
try-spur technological innovation and lower costs. In addition, he
wanted to bring communications issues into the national political
debate and, in the process, take away the leadership on communi-
cations issues from the Senate Communications Subcommittee
where it had been lodged during the 21 years John Pastore (D-
R.I.) served as Chairman. Pastore's retirement, nearly coincident
with Van Deerlin's selection as Subcommittee Chairman in the
House, opened up this opportunity.
In early September, Van Deerlin announced that the Subcom-
mittee would hold hearings later that month on the role of compe-
tition in the common carrier industry. He said that although he
was approaching the hearings with "an open mind," he predicted
that in the next Congress "there'll be a lot fewer people sponsoring
[the Bell] bill" as a result of what they learn during the House
hearings." The established telephone companies, principally
AT&T, were opposed to the rewrite project, believing that the
Subcommittee should first give its attention to the Bell Bill. Said
an AT&T spokesman: "We proposed the Consumer Communica-
tions Reform Act (H.R. 8) before they proposed the Communica-
tions Act revision, and we frankly feel that we have precedence
because the competitive field is going its merry way and we have to
work under the FCC's competitive edict.""
The November, 1976 elections had a major impact on the rewrite
project. As one Senate Commerce Committee aide put it, the 15-
member Senate Communications Subcommittee was "wiped out":
two members retired (John Pastore (D-R.I.), longtime Subcommit-
tee Chairman, and Philip Hart (D-Mich.)) and three were defeated
(Vance Hartke (D-Ind.), Frank Moss (D-Utah), and Glenn Beall
(R-Md.)). 19 The defeat of Hartke was of particular significance
since he was slated to be the new Subcommittee Chairman and
apparently would have joined Van Deerlin in pushing for a rewrite.
Hartke had said his first undertaking as Chairman would be a se-
17. TELEVISION DIGEST, Sept. 6, 1976, at 4.
18. Cohen, Communications May Never Be the Same When Congress Gets Done, NA-
TIONAL JOURNAL, Feb. 5, 1977, at 212.
19. Senate Roles Are in Upheaval After Elections, BROADCASTING, Nov. 8, 1976, at 24.
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ries of hearings "across the whole spectrum of communications"
designed to determine whether this nation's communications sys-
tem conformed to the ideals in the Act and to look at "new com-
munications technologies coming down the road that no one I
know has done a lot of preparation for."o
Despite the setbacks for rewrite in the Senate, Van Deerlin
started to gear-up in the House. During the fall, he hired addi-
tional Subcommittee staff and started lining up allies. Before
year's end, the Office of Telecommunications Policy indicated that
it would help Congress "get off the base" by preparing rewrite pro-
posals." The Subcommittee, in an effort to obtain the cooperation
of broadcasters and citizens groups, formed an advisory panel con-
sisting of eight representatives, four from the industry and four
from the citizen movement. Speaking to the Federal Communica-
tions Bar Association to muster support for the rewrite efforts,
Shooshan, Subcommittee chief counsel, expressed concern about
rumors on Capital Hill that broadcasters were out to "stonewall"
the rewrite project and observed: "If everybody spent more time
making input and less time going around Washington complaining
about who's making input, we'd all be better off."22
The 95th Congress began with renewed evidence that the Sen-
ate, after all, might involve itself in the rewrite approach. Senator
Warren Magnuson (D-Wash.), Chairman of the Commerce Com-
mittee, and Senator Ernest "Fritz" Hollings (D-S.C.), newly
elected Chairman of the Communications Subcommittee, indicated
that they planned "a total review" of the Communications Act
during the 95th Congress and asked the Office of Technology As-
sessment (OTA) to conduct a preliminary study reevaluating the
assumptions made in the Act in light of new technologies. On the
House side, the Commerce Committee approved a budget for the
Communications Subcommittee of $498,000 (nearly twice the pre-
vious year's budget) with $265,000 earmarked for 10 permanent
staff members (including the addition of an engineer and a legisla-
20. Rewrite of Communications Act Serious Subject on Hill, BROADCASTING, August 9,
1976, at 19.
21. 'Don't Stonewall'-Shooshan, TELEVISION DIGEST, Dec. 20, 1976, at 5. See also AMERI-
CAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW REFORM: LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
(1980).
22. What Happens to Broadcasting if Regulatory Act is Rewritten?, BROADCASTING, Dec.
20, 1976, at 26.
23. Senate's 'Total Review', TELEVISION DIGEST, Feb. 14, 1977, at 3. Van Deerlin and Frey
subsequently supported the OTA study and asked to be included in the deliberations. Id.
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tive assistant) and $200,000 for consultants."
The Options Papers
In April, the Subcommittee staff released the "Options Papers,"
which outlined possible new directions for communications regula-
tion of broadcasting, cable, domestic common carriers, land mobile,
international telecommunication, privacy spectrum management,
public broadcasting, and FCC structure. The papers, claimed to be
"policy neutral," set out "a series of alternative options" for the
Subcommittee to choose in rewriting the Act. For example, the
broadcasting paper, drafted by Shooshan, listed four options avail-
able to Congress in regulating broadcasting, all of them "mecha-
nisms for extracting the value of the spectrum being used and
translating that value into benefits to the public":" (1) retention of
the current licensing system, with consideration given to the ap-
propriate length of the license period, the concept of staggered re-
newals, and the types of information to be submitted in license
renewal applications; (2) a system of leasing under which the obli-
gations of a broadcaster would be specifically set out as conditions
in a lease agreement and which would generate fees based on a
percentage of profits that "could be used to accomplish desired
public benefits"; (3) a public utility approach, which would give
each broadcaster monopoly control over the frequency, with a rate
of return established that would create "an incentive to the broad-
caster to utilize excess profits for more legal programming, ex-
panded news and public affairs, minority training programs, etc.";
and (4) an access or quasi-common carrier approach whereby a
broadcaster would be treated as a common carrier for a certain
24. Id. Some observers believe that Representative Harley Staggers (D-W.Va.), Chairman
of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, was indirectly responsible for the lack
of comprehensive action on communications issues in previous years because of his keeping
only a skeleton staff to cover the hundreds of issues under the full Committee's jurisdiction.
House Panel Considers Major Overhaul of 1934 Communications Act, CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY 1113 (1977). Associate minority counsel George 'Toby' Harder described the
Committee's work in these days as "dabbling" in communications. Id. In 1974, this pattern
of control by the Chairman of the full Committee changed when the Subcommittee Chair-
men received more power and separate staffs for majority and minority members. Id.
25. Critical of the staff's failure to defend the existing Communications Act, BROADCAST-
ING commented in an editorial that the Subcommittee had "been presented with staff option
papers numbering about 800 more pages than the average Congressman will read and con-
tained in three volumes with a gross weight of six pounds, three ounces." Option No. 1,
BROADCASTING, May 2, 1977, at 90. The Option Papers were subsequently printed by the
Government Printing Office. U.S. HoUsE COMMITEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESs., OPIoNs PAPERS (Comm. Print 1977).
352 [Vol. 3
REWRITING THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
percentage of the broadcast day, with this access percentage, re-
quirement replacing most of the other more general rules or con-
cepts such as the Fairness Doctrine and equal time. The other pa-
pers-on topics ranging from cable to spectrum-took a similar
approach, namely, delineating the basic issues currently in contro-
versy and outlining, without recommendation, numerous alterna-
tive approaches that Congress could take.
The Options Papers intensified the antagonism of the cable,
broadcasting, and common carrier industries to the rewrite pro-
ject." The cable industry, though pleased with options suggesting
experiments deregulating cable, was alarmed by any discussion of
cable systems being treated as common carriers. The NAB said
that its "deepest regret about the broadcast option paper is that it
seems to assume that radical change is needed."27 AT&T warned
that radical change in the current common carrier regulatory struc-
ture "could jeopardize the continued excellence" of the present
system with its communications network in this country which "far
surpass[es] those of any other nation."2 By contrast, such citizens'
groups as the Office of Communication of the United Church of
Christ, the National Black Media Coalition, and the National Citi-
zens Committee for Broadcasting applauded the general tenor of
the Options Papers. 9
In a speech before the Iowa Broadcasters Association in June,
Vincent Wasilewski, President of the National Association of
Broadcasters, called the rewrite project "possibly the most omi-
nous and far-reaching danger we have faced in the industry."30
26. The initial reaction was summarized in a headline in the broadcasting trade press:
Options Papers: OK in General, Not So OK in the Particulars. BROADCASTING, May 2, 1977,
at 26.
Van Deerlin and Frey wanted the Options Papers to evoke controversy, and thus were
pleased that radical proposals for change were discussed: "We wanted to tell the industries
in a dramatic way that the rewrite effort was serious and merited their attention." Interview
with Lou Frey, in Washington, D.C. (July 16, 1981). A lawyer for the Senate Communica-
tions Subcommittee, while acknowledging the "laudible" objective of developing policy op-
tions, observed that the inclusion of radical and often conflicting proposals proved to be
unnecessarily divisive and served only to intensify the antagonism toward the Subcommittee
of "already apprehensive" industries. Interview with Mary Jo Manning, in Washington, D.C.
(July 13, 1981).
27. TELEVISION DIGEST, May 9, 1977, at 6.
28. Rewrite, INDUSTRIAL COMMUNICATIONS, July 8, 1977, at 8.
29. The Options Papers included alternatives such as government funding of public par-
ticipation in FCC hearings, an Agency for Consumer Protection, and an Office of Public
Counsel.
30. NAB Won't Give on Rhetoric Over Review of Broadcast law, BROADCASTING, June 20,
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'Wasilewski noted that "Chip" Shooshan had angrily criticized the
NAB's characterization of Shooshan's broadcasting options paper
as "radical and revolutionary," and retorted that the Association
would stick by those words. The NAB President urged broadcast-
ers to fight the rewrite project "with every weapon at our
disposal.""
The use of such symbolic terms as "rewrite" continued to play
an important role in the legislative dialogue. In an attempt to calm
industry fears of radical change, Van Deerlin said that his intent
was not for a "rewrite" of every sentence of the Communications
Act, but rather a "substantial reappraisal" or "review."32 He said
that the terminology had to change because "I sense that a lot of
people have become unnecessarily fearful."" Also, to improve his
liaison with the broadcasters, he hired Howard Chernoff, a retired
San Diego broadcaster and newspaper executive, to join the Sub-
committee staff as a part-time consultant. Van Deerlin expressed
the hope that "the industry will think well of Chernoff that he can
be useful to us in assuaging their fears that we're out to do them
harm."3 4 Van Deerlin also sought broadcast support by making
speeches before various state associations of broadcasters."
The criticism of Shooshan and other members of the Subcom-
mittee staff was not an isolated occurrence. Throughout the Sub-
committee's consideration of the rewrite bill, the staff members,
especially Shooshan, played a prominent public role and received
criticism from the trade press as "an arrogant crew of intellectuals
that has alienated every interest group it has dealt with."" It was
thought that Van Deerlin was largely responsible for this situation
because of the freedom he extended to Subcommittee staff mem-
1977, at 33.
31. Id. Major portions of Mr. Wasilewski's speech were reprinted in Inside the FCC, TEL-
EVISION/RADIO AGE, July 4, 1977, at 109-10.
32. Van Deerlin calls Communications Act study 'review' not a 'rewrite,' BROADCASTING,
May 20, 1977, at 19.
33. Id.
34. Government and the Media, MEDIA REPORT, April 11, 1977, at 3.
35. Van Deerlin said that he travels to state meetings of broadcasters "so they won't
think they are dealing with some far-off, far-out idealists." The Communications Act:
Broadcasters' Bogeyman, MEDIA DECIsIoNs, supra note 6, at 60.
36. Electronic Puzzle in D.C.: Comedy, Drama or Farce?, VARIETY, September 12, 1979, at
47. "Why has Shooshan been singled out for the broadcasters' enemy list? Because in recent
years, he has been outspoken on a number of subjects that tear at the industry's premises,
not to mention its pursestrings." Abrams, Inside the FCC, TELEVISION/RADIO AGE, February
28, 1977, at 101.
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bers to join the public debate over the rewrite." Broadcasting
magazine observed that the visibility of Shooshan rivaled that of
any of the Subcommittee members, something the magazine
claimed had not escaped them."
Lou Frey tried to reassure broadcasters: "The staff is not rewrit-
ing the Communications Act. If there is going to be a review of the
Act, the members are going to be doing the reviewing."39 He prom-
ised to oppose the rewrite if "things get out of control": "Nobody's
out to destroy the broadcasting industry or throw any bombs. The
world's not coming to an end. Don't jump out any windows."40 Van
Deerlin made a similar speech before the NAB Board in June to
assure broadcasters that the options papers were merely points for
discussion written by the staff and it would be the Subcommittee
itself that would produce the actual legislation. He also indicated
that no rewrite bill opposed by broadcasters would have any
chance of passage. Thus, both Van Deerlin and Frey could con-
tinue to maintain an active dialogue with broadcasters in order to
obtain their support.
During the next few months, the Subcommittee held 33 days of
hearings, involving 484 witnesses, primarily consisting of seminar-
style panel discussions on such topics as spectrum management,
ownership and industry structure, regulation versus competition,
and new technologies.4' Variety commented that the Options Pa-
pers might as well have not been written for all the consideration
they were given during the hearings. A disappointment to Van
Deerlin was that most of the witnesses were heard only by himself
and Lou Frey; other members of the Subcommittee dropped in
only occasionally because of their involvement on the House floor,
where energy bills were under consideration," or because of their
37. Van Deerlin: Making a difference, BROADCASTING, May 7, 1979, at 42. Shooshan com-
mented: "I don't do anything or say anything that Van Deerlin doesn't know about or ap-
prove." "It's a game plan that Van [Deerlin] controls." Id.
38. Id.
39. Van Deerlin and Frey Defend Rewrite, TELEVISION DIGEST, June 27, 1977, at 3.
40. Id.
41. In August, NAB President Wasilewski sent a letter to Van Deerlin recommending
that a transcript of the hearings be reprinted as soon as possible, and commented that the
record "would provide an excellent reference" source for Subcommittee members and for
future research. TELEVISION DIGEST, August 15, 1977, at 4.
The panel discussion hearing record was never published because the stenographer, given
the free form of the roundtable discussions, was unable to follow the discussion or transcribe
the tapes.
42. Van Deerlin Lowers Curtain on Act One, BROADCASTING, August 8, 1977, at 21.
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perception of the futility of omnibus rewrite legislation. Van Deer-
lin's frustration was occasioned by the apparent futility of trying
to persuade "members of Congress that we're in the middle of a
technological revolution in communication. One that just won't
wait. We have to make them realize that, if there's no sweeping
revision, there's going to be pandemonium.""
The Chairman was also having difficulty convincing Subcommit-
tee members of his ability to put together a politically viable re-
write bill. A Subcommittee member questioned whether Van Deer-
lin's "ineptness" in finding a consensus on a report on violence on
television "throws into question whether the Subcommittee could
handle rewriting the Communications Act."" Van Deerlin ac-
knowledged that he had failed to provide firm leadership and said
it was "much better to have it happen on an issue like the violence
report."4
During the fall, Van Deerlin and Frey met with specially created
broadcast and cable advisory groups which consisted entirely of in-
dustry representatives. "There has been a total change . . . 180 de-
grees" in the broadcasters' attitude toward the rewrite project,
Frey commented after a five-hour meeting with broadcasters."
Buoyed by a favorable reaction they got in a meeting with the Na-
tional Cable Television Association's rewrite committee, Van Deer-
lin and Frey said they were now optimistic that the rewrite legisla-
tion would get through Congress before 1980.
There was some discussion at the broadcast advisory committee
of two possible trade-offs: (1) a form of mandated public access,
requiring stations to give time to groups or individuals to express
their views in exchange for repeal of the Fairness Doctrine and
equal time; and (2) a requirement that broadcasters pay a percent-
age of their gross revenues to support public broadcasting or to
43. The Communications Act: Broadcasters' Bogeyman, MEDIA DECISIONS, supra note 6,
at 60. One observer commented that the biggest legislative obstacle to rewriting the Com-
munications Act was "that most congressmen, as well as most of the public, do not see a
need for change in the three industries. Telephones do work. And one can choose from a
wide range of radio and television news and entertainment programs." A Slick, Thoughtful
Overhaul of the Communications Industry; BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 12, at 86. Frey at-
tributed poor attendance by other members of the Subcommittee to the perception by most
Congressmen that there was not a "constituency" for communications issues. Interview with
Lou Frey, in Washington, D.C. (July 16, 1981).
44. Victories on Saccharin, Violence, TELEVISION DIGEST, Aug. 26, 1977, at 2.
45. Id.
46. Euphoria about rewrite in San Diego, BROADCASTING, Nov. 14, 1977, at 20.
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boost minority ownership of stations in exchange for deregulation
and longer license terms. A broadcaster attending the meeting
said: "The Committee kept talking about trade-offs, asking what
we'd be willing to give up. We didn't propose giving up
anything."4 7
Van Deerlin and Frey apparently had underestimated the nega-
tive reaction broadcasters would have to the mention of trade-offs.
Two weeks after the meeting, Shooshan told Broadcasting that it
would "be difficult to get even radio deregulation through the sub-
committee unless there is something that the public and public in-
terest groups see in it for them-a trade-off." 8 He said that as a
matter of practical politics a trade-off would be necessary if broad-
casters were offered a plus in the rewrite, but acknowledged that
politics would not permit the imposition of license fees or
mandatory access requirement on broadcasters if they did not
want them."
Responding to Shooshan's "tit-for-tat" approach and a state-
ment by Van Deerlin indicating that to gain approval of the re-
write broadcasters would have to give ground, the broadcast advi-
sory committee unanimously agreed to refuse Vhn Deerlin's
request for a list of rewrite priorities. In a letter to Van Deerlin,
the group expressed disdain for the rewrite approach, observing
that "any amendments to the Communications Act should be
made with a rifle, not with a shotgun." 0
Van Deerlin was reported as being "really ticked off" at the
broadcast advisory committee for failing to submit a list of priori-
ties: "I could hardly believe it when they decided to tell the Sub-
committee 'Just go away. Just leave things as is.' "' He said that
the appointments made by the Carter Administration (Charles
Ferris to the FCC, Henry Geller to the NTIA, and Michael Pert-
schuk to the FTC) should lead broadcasters toward a closer rela-
47. Rewrite Back on track-Van Deerlin, TELEVISION DIGEST, Nov. 14, 1977, at 1.
48. Shooshan sees little change for broadcasting in act rewrite, BROADCASTING, Nov. 21,
1977, at 22.
49. Id. Shooshan also stated that, in his view, "the politics of the subcommittee won't
permit the outright repeal of the fairness doctrine and equal time." Id.
50. Hot broadcasters turn cold again over the rewrite, BROADCASTING, Dec. 12, 1977, at
21.
51. Van Deerlin & Rewrite, TELEVISION DIGEST, Dec. 19, 1977, at 4. Van Deerlin was re-
ported to have had a "personal quarrel" with the advisory committee for releasing its letter
to the trade press before he had been informed of its contents. If there ever was a honey-
moon, it's over, BROADCASTING, Dec. 19, 1977, at 22.
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tionship with a potentially sympathetic Congress. Another way
broadcasters could cooperate with the rewrite, Van Deerlin said,
would be to seek some common ground with broadcasting's critics:
"When push comes to shove, the broadcasters are going to find out
some things about these public interest organizations that they
didn't know last year." He left the door open for further discus-
sions with the advisory group: "The candle will remain in, the
window."5 2
In an attempt to salve the wounds opened by the broadcast advi-
sory committee's action, NAB President Wasilewski sent a concili-
atory letter to Van Deerlin stating that the Association had coop-
erated and wanted to continue to cooperate on the rewrite. He
expressed hope that a "relatively minor past misunderstanding"
can be "wiped off the slate," noting that the advisory committee
had not been empowered to draft legislation or negotiate for the
industry.8 Wasilewski pointed out the position of the NAB, as set
forth in a "statement of principles" adopted by the Association's
Board, was that a dramatic overhaul of the Communications Act
"might seriously impair or destroy a system that has successfully
fulfilled its mandate to the public."" Van Deerlin replied to Wasi-
lewski, writing that the "candle still burns brightly" if the NAB
was willing to talk about "trade-offs." He characterized NAB's
"statement of principles" as a document whose message seemed to
be, "Keep the gold in Fort Knox." He added: "It reads like the
report of a committee project co-chaired by King Midas and Marie
Antoinette, with Barbara Fritchie penciling in the rhetoric.""
Despite the rhetoric, Van Deerlin and the broadcast advisory
committee did meet again in February, 1978, although the only
tangible agreement from the meeting was a commitment to give
the advisory committee an opportunity to review a draft of the re-
write bill. Broadcasters were assured that the entire rewrite project
would continue to be closely supervised by the Subcommittee
52. If there ever was a honeymoon, it's over, BROADCASTING, supra, note 51, at 22. Several
days later, the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ submitted a propo-
sal for the rewrite. Van Deerlin called the proposal "significant, enlightened and well-pre-
pared. . . . It's the only comprehensive proposal for a revision of the act that we've received
so far. That is what we've wanted all the interested parties to do." Church Group Drafts
Proposals to Update Communications Act, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1977, at 65.
53. NAB Says It Isn't So, BROADCASTING, Jan. 2, 1978, at 22.
54. Id.
55. Van Deerlin Widens the Rift Over Rewrite, BROADCASTING, Jan. 9, 1978, at 24.
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members themselves.56 The drafting of the bill had become so con-
troversial and the lobbying so intense that Van Deerlin and Frey
had their staffs meet in closed drafting sessions at the legislative
counsel's office-and arguably contrary to the promises of close su-
pervision by all members of the Subcommittee, neither the other
Subcommittee members nor their aids were invited to these
discussions.5 7
While the Subcommittee was considering the "Options Papers,"
there were several court decisions that made legislation more ur-
gent for some groups and less urgent for others. Most of those de-
cisions favored the cable industry and undermined the interests of
broadcasters and AT&T. For example, in March, 1977, the Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC's rules limit-
ing the programming offered by pay cable systems which were
designed to prevent the "siphoning" of popular programs from
conventional, advertiser-supported television.58 A series of court
decisions continued to erode AT&T's telephone service monopoly.
In July, 1977, the same Court of Appeals ruled that the FCC had
to furnish local interconnection of competitors with Bell subscrib-
ers unless it specifically determined that "the public interest would
be served by creating an AT&T monopoly" in the given area.5" The
ruling effectively legalized specialized common carriers, such as
MCI's "Execunet" service, which then competed with AT&T's long
distance telephone service.
The Rewrite Bill (H.R. 13015)
On June 7, 1978, Van Deerlin and Frey held a press conference
to unveil H.R. 13015, a 217 page bill that abolished the FCC, re-
placed it with a Communications Regulatory Commission, and de-
clared in its preamble that governmental intervention in the
telecommunications field would be allowed only "to the extent
56. The "Rewrite": Animal, Vegetable or Mineral?, BROADCASTING, Feb. 27, 1978, at 29.
57. B. COLE & M. CETrINGER, RELUCTANT REGULATORS: THE FCC AND THE BROADCAST Au-
DIENCE 311 (rev. ed. 1978). Edwina Dowell, former Subcommittee staff counsel, said that
since other members of the Subcommittee were not ready to draft a bill, invitations were
neither extended nor expected. Telephone interview with Edwina Dowell (July 9, 1981).
58. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
59. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978). The next year, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed an
FCC order which required AT&T to allow customers of its private line services to "share" or
"resell" those services in a manner that would use facilities more efficiently and promote
competition at the retail service level.
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marketplace forces are deficient." Van Deerlin said: "I can't think
of any legislation going into the hopper with as much fact-finding
and deliberation behind it as this bill." 0 Both Van Deerlin and
Frey acknowledged that the bill nevertheless represented only a
starting point, but once again expressed confidence that rewrite
legislation would be approved by both houses of Congress in 1979.
H.R. 13015, described by Broadcasting as "a deregulator's
dream," 1 represented an attempt to balance the economic and reg-
ulatory interests of the broadcast, cable, and telephone industries
by proposing significant benefits and painful "trade-offs" for each
industry. The following summarizes the main provisions of the bill:
Radio Broadcasting. Radio stations would be totally deregulated
except for technical, engineering matters. Licenses would be
granted indefinitely, subject to revocation only for violations of
technical rules.
Television Broadcasting. Television licenses would at first be
granted for five years and then granted indefinitely 10 years after
enactment of the bill. The Fairness Doctrine, abolished in its en-
tirety for radio, would be replaced in television with an "equity
principle" requiring stations carrying programs on controversial is-
sues to do so equitably. The equal time requirement, no longer ap-
plicable to radio, would be limited for television to candidates for
President, Vice-President, U.S. Senate, and other statewide offices.
Television stations would be required to air locally produced pro-
gramming "throughout the broadcast day."
Broadcasting Multiple Ownership. All present current multiple
ownerships would be grandfathered. Overall limits in the future
would be dropped from seven to five stations in both television and
radio. (Owners may now hold up to 21 stations: seven televi-
sion-no more than five of which may be VHF-seven AM and
seven FM stations.) Also, ownership of AM, FM, and television
stations would be limited to one station in individual markets.
Cable. Cable television would not be regulated at the Federal
level, leaving regulation of this medium to state and local authori-
60. Arieff, House Panel OfJers Plan to Deregulate Communications, CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY 1547 (1978). Both Van Deerlin and Frey were aware of the pitfalls of the "base-
ment-to-attic" approach and anticipated the possibility that the broadcasting provisions
might have to be "broken off" from the common carrier and cable provisions-contrary to
their public posture on this issue, they were prepared to take that step at an appropriate
time. Interview with Lou Frey, Wash., D.C. (July 16, 1981).
61. And It Is from the Basement to the Attic, BROADCASTING, June 12, 1978, at 29.
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ties." However, the bill would also repeal a law involving rates to
be charged cable systems for use of telephone poles (commonly
known as the "pole attachment" bill), legislation that cable sought
hard in order to get the federal government to regulate what they
considered to be exorbitant pole attachment fees. 3
Spectrum Fees. The owners of broadcast stations and other
users of the electromagnetic spectrum would be required to pay
fees based on the value of the spectrum they used; the fees would
be phased in over a 10-year period. The proceeds would go to a
"Telecommunications Fund" to support (a) federal regulation, (b)
public broadcast programming, (c) minority ownership of broad-
cast stations, and (d) the development of telecommunications ser-
vices in rural areas.
Public Broadcasting. The Corporation for Public Broadcasting
would be replaced by a private, nonprofit Public Telecommunica-
tions Programming Endowment whose sole purpose would be to
provide grants for production and acquisition of programming. The
bill would eliminate existing restrictions on editorializing and en-
dorsement of political candidates by public broadcasters.
Common Carrier. The bill would remove nearly all restrictions
that now prevent AT&T from entering other fields of telecommu-
nications (including cable and computer services), would require
the divestiture of Western Electric (Bell's equipment manufactur-
ing subsidiary), and would subject the Bell system to increased
competition. Of particular importance was the bill's rejection of
the approach advocated in the Bell Bill to restrict the degree of
competition in telephone communications.
Communications Regulatory Commission. In place of the seven-
member FCC, a five-member Communications Regulatory Com-
mission would be created; 4 Commissioners would be appointed for
one 10-year term and would be subject to stricter conflict-of-inter-
est rules. An Office of Consumer Assistance would be created
within the Commission to act as a public ombudsman.
62. The word "cable" is not mentioned in H.R. 13015. The closest description of cable in
the bill is "interstate telecommunications facility" which does not use "electromagnetic fre-
quency spectrum in the distribution of such service to customers."
63. And It Is from the Basement to the Attic, BROADCASTING, supra note 61, at 39.
64. According to BROADCASTING magazine, the name of the FCC, which was changed as a
symbolic gesture to indicate a clean break with the past, took only 10 minutes to think up
and is attributed to Ron Coleman, minority counsel for the Subcommittee. And It Is from
the Basement to the Attic, BROADCASTING, supra, note 61, at 39.
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National Telecommunications Agency. The Commerce Depart-
ment's National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion would be abolished and replaced with a National Telecommu-
nications Agency. The Agency would have primary responsibility
for developing and implementing executive branch policy-making
and would advise the President on telecommunications matters.
Television Digest commented that the reaction of the broadcast,
cable, and common carrier industries to H.R. 13015 was "similar to
that of [a] man kissing his sister: Nice, but not that nice. It offers a
juicy carrot to all, at the same time taking something away.""
Thus, the initial comments from leaders in the affected industries
typically consisted of praise for the benefits bestowed on them by
H.R. 13015 (usually at the beginning of the press release) followed
by a denunciation of any trade-offs. Wasilewski, for example, said
that the NAB applauded "much of what the House Communica-
tions Subcommittee is attempting to accomplish-less regulation,
achievement of greater First Amendment protection, a fair climate
for industry growth and increased service to the public," and then
noted the NAB's strong opposition to the spectrum fee proposal."
Robert Schmidt, President of the National Cable Television Asso-
ciation, applauded the proposed deregulation of cable at the Fed-
eral level but asked the Subcommittee to assure that "regulations
dismantled on the federal level would not be reassembled on the
state level."67 He also expressed concern that the bill would allow
AT&T-"the world's largest and most profitable monopoly"-to
enter the cable business.68 William Ellinghaus, AT&T Vice Chair-
man, said that AT&T "welcomes provisions of the bill that pre-
clude constraints on the kinds of technology" common carriers can
offer their customers and "the bill's declared intent to assure . . .
full and fair competition."" He said AT&T would oppose the pro-
posed divestiture of Western Electric, predicting that such action
"would slow technological innovation, increase the cost of facilities
and lead eventually to higher rates for services."1o
65. The Rewrite-It's Here, TELEVISION DIGEST, June 12, 1978, at 1.
66. Id. at 3.
67. At First Blush: No Panic in the Industry Street, BROADCASTING, June 12, 1978, at 40.
Steve Effros, Executive Director of the Community Antenna Television Association, com-
mented: "The bill has thrown us out to sea and released a shark-Bell." Rewrite Bill Draws
Mixed Reviews from Cable Industry, VuE, June 26, 1978, at 7.
68. At First Blush: No Panic in the Industry Street, BROADCASTING, supra, note 67, at 40.
69. Communications Law Overhaul Is Being Proposed, Wall St. J., June 8, 1978, p. 2, col.
2, at p. 32, col. 3.
70. Id.
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The reaction from citizens groups, in contrast to the ambivalent
statements of industry leaders, was uniformly hostile. Everett
Parker, director of the United Church of Christ's Office of Commu-
nications, called the bill's proposals "a disgrace . . . a bigger give-
away of public rights and property than Teapot Dome."7 1 Nolan
Bowie, executive director of the Citizens Communications Center,
complained that "nowhere in the bill is the term 'public interest'
used."7 2
The emotional intensity of citizen groups' reaction may be at-
tributed to a feeling of betrayal by the Subcommittee. They com-
plained that none of the alternatives listed in the Options Papers
for increased and more effective consumer representation before
the FCC was included in H.R. 13015. Nor were any of the reforms
suggested by public interest advocates at Subcommittee hearings
adopted.73 Andrew Schwartzman, executive director of the Media
Access Project, observed that although nobody expected the ulti-
mate bill to have much resemblance to H.R. 13015, it mattered a
great deal where the starting point was.74 Since citizens groups lack
the economic and political capital to sustain intensive lobbying
campaigns, Schwartzman said, they are "outgunned very much
more at the end of the legislative process. So when the bill starts
out as one that is essentially unfavorable to the interests we re-
present, it is only going to get worse."75
In hindsight, the most perceptive of the initial reactions to H.R.
13015 was that of broadcast historian Eric Barnouw. "I didn't
71. Plan Seeks to Lessen F.C.C. Role, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1978, § D, at 1, col. 6. Dr.
Parker's allusion to Teapot Dome, which was prominently mentioned in virtually every
newspaper and magazine story on H.R. 13015, irked Van Deerlin: "I must say I feel a little
stung now and then by charges that deregulation is gouging at the public interest . . . that
it's comparable to Teapot Dome or the railroad land grants." Van Deerlin: Making a Differ-
ence, BROADCASTING, supra note 5, at 46.
72. House Panel Offers Plan to Deregulate Communications, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY,
supra note 60, at 1547. Van Deerlin explained why the "public interest" standard was omit-
ted: "We thought the phrase never really meant anything to users of the airwaves and to
those who regulate the industry . .. A lot of games have been played with it, and there have
been a lot.of empty promises made to serve the public interest. But stations automatically
received license renewals no matter what they promised and no matter what the quality of
their product." Broadcast Regulation: Plan Makes Waves, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1978, § C,
at 19, col. 3.
73. H. Shulman, Is Structural and Procedural Change a Better Answer for Consumers
than the 'Reform' of Abolishing the FCC, in T. HAIGHT, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND
THE CITIZEN 82-83 (1979).
74. M. Friedman, A New Communications Act: The Debate Begins, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REv., Oct., 1978, at 41.
75. Id.
No. 3]1 363
COMM/ENT LAW JOURNAL
study it very much," Barnouw told the Washington Post, "because
I was sure it wouldn't go through in any form resembling the way
it is now. The commercial broadcasters will attack the notion of
the fee . . . to support public broadcasting and the media-access
people will attack everything else. They'll probably both succeed in
chipping away at it.""
One of the most apparent strategies of Van Deerlin and his staff
was to weaken the opposition of broadcasters by driving a wedge
between radio and television. H.R. 13015 provided greater deregu-
lation for radio than television. Also, the proposed schedule of fees
was devised so that VHF television stations (users of the largest
portion of the broadcast spectrum) would pay more than 90% of
the fees assessed broadcasters. The month after H.R. 13015 was
introduced, the National Radio Broadcasters Association's Board
of Directors met with Van Deerlin and the Subcommittee staff and
announced that NRBA was completely behind the Communica-
tions Act rewrite. NRBA Prsident James Gabbert said the Associa-
tion's directors believe that "it's the best thing that ever happened
to radio." Van Deerlin, in a speech before the NRBA which was
critical of the NAB, said that the current FCC regulation of radio
"is a situation which is exploited by those who purport to re-
present you as broadcasters and not as radio broadcasters. This is
an important distinction." 78 Lou Frey took a similar stance, urging
the NRBA "to put the pressure on the right way and don't get run
over by anybody."7
During the hearings conducted by the Subcommittee during the
summer and fall, the broadcasting provisions of the bill which at-
tracted the most attention were the omission of the public interest
standard and the proposal for a spectrum fee. Broadcasting maga-
zine commented that the Communications Act of 1934 is "the in-
dispensable Linus blanket," with both the regulators and the regu-
lated united in common alarm at the proposed disappearance of
the "public interest, convenience and necessity."80 Four of six FCC
Commissioners (Chairman Charles Ferris, Abbott Washburn, Rob-
ert E. Lee, and Tyrone Brown) testified in opposition to the substi-
tution of the "marketplace" standard for the "public interest."
76. Reactions, Washington Post, June 13, 1978, § B, at 8, col. 2.
77. NRBA Lines Up with the Rewrite, BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978, at 29.
78. Rewrite & Good Vibes at NRBA, TELEVISON DIGEST, Sept. 25, 1978, at 1.
79. Id.
80. Square One, BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978, at 114.
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The testimony of these Commissioners varied in intensity from
"mild to outraged" opposition to H.R. 13015, prompting Van Deer-
lin to complain "in feigned injury that he had been given the mask
of Simon Legree."'I By contrast, Henry Geller, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce for Telecommunications and Information, was
generally supportive of H.R. 13015 and agreed with the deletion of
the "public interest" standard: "All the public interest standard
says is 'We give up.' Congress doesn't know [how to regulate
communications]."
Judging from the testimony at the Subcommittee's hearings, the
negatives of H.R. 13015 far outweighed the positives as industry
and public witnesses alike vented their worst fears about the new
order-or disorder-the bill would create.8" Van Deerlin repeatedly
assured witnesses that the bill would not be placed before the Sub-
committee for mark-up.until there was a rewrite of the rewrite. He
said the revised bill would be far less painful to both industry and
citizens groups because it would have to sound reasonable to 435
congressmen: "We're not looking to be laughed out of town."" Van
Deerlin, for example, believed there was only a semantic difference
between the "public interest" and the bill's "marketplace" stan-
dard, but indicated that it would be worth including the phrase
"public interest, convenience and necessity" if "it's going to save
any votes in the House."" He assured the cable industry that he
would respond to NCTA's request for Federal preemption to avoid
more regulation by state and local governments."
Van Deerlin was willing to make these accommodations in order
to produce a bill that would gain the support of his colleagues.
Omission of the "public interest" standard was viewed by some
Congressmen as signaling an unwillingness to insure protection of
81. FCC Consensus Is Against Key Elements of H.R. 13015, BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978,
at 80. Shooshan was of the view that "Ferris's natural instinct for protecting his turf" re-
sulted in a series of actions designed to undercut the House rewrite effort. For example, in
Shooshan's view, the Commission's decisions on radio deregulation, cable deregulation, com-
puters, and common carrier deregulation were motivated by Ferris's desire to remove the
incentives of various industry groups to support the rewrite legislation. Interview with
Harry Shooshan, Jr., in Washington, D.C. (June 26, 1981).
82. Geller Wants Full Authority Over Allocation of Spectrum Space, BROADCASTING,
July 24, 1978, at 84.
83. BROADCASTING, Sept. 18, 1978, at 23.
84. Id.
85. BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978, at 80.
86. BROADCASTING, October 2, 1978, at 57.
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the consumers of communications.87 However, while Van Deerlin
regarded the spectrum fee as the essential quid pro quo of deregu-
lating broadcasters, several of the most active members of the Sub-
committee-Tim Wirth (D-Colo.), Martin Russo (D-Ill.), and
Henry Waxman (D-Cal.)-expressed strong reservations about the
concept as well as where the funds collected from fees would go."
Adding to the uncertainty of the political vitality of the rewrite
approach was the retirement of Frey, the bill's co-sponsor, to run
for Governor of Florida.
Van Deerlin, however, found solace in the October, 1978 an-
nouncement by Senate Communications Subcommittee Chairman
Hollings of plans for a "renovation" of the Communications Act.
Hollings observed: "The '34 act should not be packed off to a nurs-
ing home. But it must be renovated to meet a new age."89 Van
Deerlin seized upon Hollings' call for "omnibus amendments" to
the Act as indicating support for his own rewrite efforts.90 Another
development in the fall of 1978 which was cause for encouragement
to Van Deerlin was the decision of the Court of Appeals in WESH-
TV [Central Florida Enterprises, Inc. v. FCC, 598 F.2d 37, D.C.
Cir. 1978], a decision which made broadcasters believe more ur-
gently than ever in the need for legislative license renewal relief.
Rewrite of the Rewrite (H.R. 3333)
Van Deerlin, in an interview in the January 1, 1979 issue of
Broadcasting, once again expressed optimism about the passage of
a rewrite bill by the end of 1980. Acknowledging his role as a "bro-
ker" trying to bring groups together with shared interests, he
noted that there had been some encouraging developments. Fore-
most, he said, was a growing consensus within the telephone indus-
try for rewrite legislation-an aspect of the bill that in 1979
seemed "more insoluble than broadcasting." 91 Second, he was en-
87. Van Deerlin subsequently characterized the deletion of the "public interest" standard
as a "political error of the first magnitude." BROADCASTING, Mar. 19, 1979, at 92.
88. TELEVISION DIGEST, Aug. 21, 1978, at 1. Wirth later expressed support for the spec-
trum fee concept at field hearings conducted by the Subcommittee in December.
89. BROADCASTING, Oct. 16, 1978, at 22.
90. Id.
91. BROADCASTING, Jan. 1, 1979, at 32. Van Deerlin said that the heads of the independent
telephone companies are "joining in solutions that didn't seem possible two years ago." Id.
He regarded as significant that AT&T Chairman John deButts initially opposed permitting
the unrestrained growth of new business carriers, but is now of the view that "we have to
find ways to accomodate to the new era." Id.
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couraged by the decision of the NAB Board, reversing its previous
position, to submit its own legislative proposal. A major reason for
NAB's apparent change in attitude, according to Van Deerlin, was
the provision in H.R. 13015 for near total deregulation of radio.
Since numerically radio constitutes more than 80% of the indus-
try, the radio deregulation provision, Van Deerlin noted, had
"driven a wedge" between radio and television licensees and made
it difficult for others to hold the line against the rewrite.9 2 He re-
jected as politically unwise suggestions that radio deregulation be
considered separately from the rewrite: "You would lose the inter-
est of 8,000 commercial broadcasters . . . . If you want to get a
whole package, you'd better keep a single set of strings around
it."9" Van Deerlin said that the ultimate test for the rewrite would
be how it stood up in Congress, where communications matters
have not traditionally been considered major matters, and the key
to getting it passed was to produce a measure that "is perceived as
being fair and equitable.""
With the retirement of Frey, James Collins (R-Tex.) became the
Subcommittee ranking minority member. This was a development
many observers viewed as hurting Van Deerlin's chances for a bi-
partisan joint sponsorship. Collins said initially that he would like
to see the rewrite legislation broken into three or four different
bills, but then, surprisingly, indicated that despite reservations
about the public broadcasting, spectrum fee, and other sections of
H.R. 13015, he would sponsor a rewrite bill. This statement sur-
prised broadcasters since he had sent a letter to Texas broadcast-
ers stating that he would not be a rewrite co-sponsor. According to
the trade press, Collins agreed to co-sponsor the bill only after
Representative James Broyhill, (R-N.C.), a member of the Sub-
committee, agreed to be a co-sponsor, leaving him in a somewhat
awkward position as ranking minority member yet not playing a
leadership role." Another factor which prompted Collins to change
92. Id. Other subcommittee members viewed the owners of VHF televisions stations in
the large markets as constituting a more potent political force than small market radio
stations.
93. Id. In the fall of 1977, NAB Board Chairman Donald Thurston accused Van Deerlin
of trying to "divide NAB's constituency" with his talk of separate treatment of radio and
television: "Yet he does not have a separate radio bill. . . . He says we're different in order
to gain political points, but he treats us with one bill because he knows we are one industry.
He'd like to seduce the radio industry with false promises in order to do his will on televi-
sion." BROADCASTING, Oct. 23, 1978, at 24.
94. BROADCASTING, Jan. 1, 1979, at 32.
95. TELEVISION DIGEST, Mar. 26, 1979, at 6.
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his position was the willingness of Van Deerlin to take out "some
of the more objectionable features" of the revised bill, such as the
link between the proposed spectrum fee and the support of public
broadcasting." Collins and Broyhill also conditioned their co-spon-
sorship, declining a commitment to support all the provisions of
the new bill.
On March 12, 1979, Hollings introduced S. 611 (611 coinciden-
tally is the number of the Bell System's telephone repair service), a
measure which was co-sponsored by Commerce Committee Chair-
man Cannon and Subcommittee member Ted Stevens (R-Alaska).
On the same day, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), the Subcom-
mittee's ranking Republican member, together with Harrison
Schmidt (R-N.M.) and Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), introduced S. 622.
While both bills were considerably less sweeping than H.R. 13015,
Van Deerlin said he was very pleased: "The very fact that bills
were introduced by both the [Senate] chairman and the ranking
member tells us we're a heck of a lot closer to enactment than any-
one would have thought possible." 7
Almost until the moment the Senate bills were introduced, Hol-
lings and Goldwater were talking about joining forces behind a sin-
gle bill, but their negotiations broke down over the spectrum fee
issue."' Goldwater, in his statement on the Senate floor introducing
S. 622, said: "I found it impossible to support a bill which included
license fees based on the scarcity value of the radio frequency
spectrum.""
As shown in the following summary, S. 611 was, as described by
Hollings, a "renovation" which left' intact much of the existing
Communications Act, while S. 622 called for more sweeping
changes with respect to broadcast deregulation.
Senate Bill 611
License Terms. The license terms for radio would be indefinite
but the FCC would "audit" a random sample of all stations annu-
ally. The term of television licenses would be increased to five
years.
Renewal Procedures. To take away any uncertainty created by
96. BROADCASTING, Mar. 26, 1979, at 30.
97. TELEVISION DIGEST, Mar. 19, 1979, at 1.
98. BROADCASTING, Mar. 19, 1979, at 35.
99. Id.
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the Court of Appeals' WESH-TV decision, the FCC would be pro-
hibited in comparative renewal proceedings from considering other
media interests of the incumbent if the licensee complied with the
FCC's rules on cross-ownership.
Fees. Users of the spectrum would pay a "public resource" fee,
which would generate $80 million a year. Nearly all ($79 million)
would be paid by broadcasters, and nearly all of that amount ($77
million) would come from television stations.
Cable. Restrictions on cable's use of broadcast signals would be
permitted only when the broadcaster met the burden of proving
the need for the restriction. The bill would provide for state regu-
lation of cable franchising in general, local access channels, sub-
scriber fees, and other requirements not affecting broadcast trans-
mission. Telephone companies would be permitted to own cable
systems operated by others.
Spectrum Changes. A National Commission on Spectrum Man-
agement would be created to conduct an 18-month study and rec-
ommend improvements in the allocation and management of the
spectrum.
Senate Bill 622
License Terms. License terms for radio would be made indefi-
nite. For television, the term would be three years for stations in
the top 25 markets, would be extended to four years for stations in
markets 26-100, and five years for stations in markets below the
top 100.
Renewal Procedures. The FCC would be required to renew a sta-
tion's licezise if the license "substantially met" community
problems, needs, and interests during the preceding term. In com-
parative renewal situations, the FCC would undertake a two-step
process whereby the proceeding would be terminated if the incum-
bent licensee had met the renewal standard.
Fees. The FCC would charge a fee based only on the cost of reg-
ulation, not on the basis specified in S. 611 (that spectrum users
were making profits from a public resource). The Commission, the
ultimate recipient of the funds, would determine the size of the
fees.
Cable. Cable and pay television would continue to be regulated
at the federal level, but the burden of proof for restricting cable
carriage of distant signals would be shifted to the broadcaster. The
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FCC would be authorized to adopt anti-siphoning rules protecting
sports events. The FCC also would be authorized to adopt rules for
cable systems on equal employment opportunity, access channels,
access for political candidates, equal time, and the Fairness Doc-
trine. Broadcasters would be allowed to own and operate cable sys-
tems, while telephone companies would be permitted to provide
cable facilities but not to control program content.
Deregulation. The bill would eliminate radio station guidelines
for the presentation of news, public affairs, and other
nonentertainment programming; community ascertainment; regu-
lation of program formats; the Fairness Doctrine (the equal time
requirement and the personal attack rule would be retained); pro-
gram log requirements; and restrictions on the advertising of prod-
ucts that are legally sold. The FCC would be required to look for
ways to cut back on television regulations and to make annual pro-
gress reports to Congress. Congress would be given the power to
veto any new rule that would increase regulation of television.
Less than three weeks later, Van Deerlin unveiled H.R. 3333,
known as Rewrite II, or "Son of Rewrite,".,a bill which differed in
many significant ways from his earlier bill, H.R. 13015. He ex-
pressed optimism that the bill would be passed in the 96th Con-
gress: "How does Thanksgiving grab you?"100 Helping the bill's
prospects, Van Deerlin believed, was the co-sponsorship by Collins
and Broyhill. Van Deerlin perceived that Collins' image as a "self-
proclaimed conservative would certainly cast an aura for people I
am not able to persuade."101 Another reason for Van Deerlin's opti-
mism was "new evidence within the last few days of administration
support" for the rewrite.10' He also pointed to a "qhange in the
political climate" in the Senate reflected by the introduction of S.
611 and S. 622.10o
H.R. 3333 was in many ways more radical than H.R. 13015, but
it still managed to provide sweeteners in the form of more freedom
and less regulation to attract support from the broadcast, cable,
and common carrier industries. Broadcasting characterized the bill
as an attempt by Van Deerlin to bid "for adjustments that will
meet most objections of contending forces without being all things
100. TELEVISION DIGEST, Apr. 1, 1979, at 4.
101. Id.
102. BROADCASTING, Apr. 2, 1979, at 29.
103. Id.
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to all comers by compromising his basic philosophies."0
As shown in the following summary, however, the bill also intro-
duced several new concepts that would be regarded as radical by
citizens lobbies and the cable industry.
H.R. 3333
License Terms. The license term for radio would be indefinite.
For television, the term would be five years and then would be in-
definite after two renewals.
Renewal Procedures. Comparative renewal proceedings would be
abolished. If the Communications Regulatory Commission decided
to deny or revoke a television license, the new licensee would be
chosen by lottery.
Fees. License fees would be assessed on all commercial users of
the spectrum and would be based on the cost of processing a li-
cense application and the scarcity value of the spectrum used. The
total fees to be collected at the end of a 10-year phase-in period
would be about $150 million. (Under H.R. 13015, the fees were ex-
pected to generate about $300 million to $400 million annually).
About 80% of the fees would come from television. The money
would go into the general fund of the U.S. Treasury. (In H.R.
13015, the money was earmarked for public broadcasting and other
programs.)
Cable. The bill would eliminate all current government regula-
tion of cable. As a trade-off, cable systems would no longer be able
to carry broadcast programming without permission from either
the broadcaster or the program owner. The Department of Justice
would decide whether broadcast crossownership of cable systems in
the same market should be prohibited. Telephone companies
would be able to own cable systems; however, if telephone compa-
nies began offering services such as' pay programming and video-
text, they would be required to make the system's facilities availa-
ble to anyone else wanting to do the same.
Deregulation. The bill would do away with nearly all but the
technical regulation of radio. The Fairness Doctrine, equal time,
EEO enforcement, and program format requirements would be
eliminated for radio. For television, the Commission would con-
tinue to enforce the Fairness Doctrine (although only at renewal
104. Id.
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time), EEO regulations, and a requirement that if time were sold
to one candidate for public office, it must be sold to all other can-
didates for that office. To be eligible for renewal, television stations
would have to show that they broadcast "local public affairs and
local programming" throughout the day. These requirements
would be in effect only for two five-year terms; after two terms, all
content regulation of television would cease.
Ownership Limitations. Except for a ban on owning more than
one AM and one FM station in the same market, there would be
no restrictions on the ownership of radio stations. No entity would
be allowed to own more than seven television stations overall nor
more than one television station per market.
Public Broadcasting. Public broadcasting stations would be per-
mitted to carry commercials, clustered in no more than three
places during the day and totaling no more than 3% of total pro-
gram time. In addition, public broadcasting would be given a per-
manent Congressional authorization of $1.50 per person per year.
The most hostile reaction to Van Deerlin's new bill came from
citizens' groups. The Office of Communication of the United
Church of Christ condemned H.R. 3333 as the "Titanic without
lifeboats." 06 NCCB Board Chairman Nicholas Johnson labeled the
bill "a multibillion dollar giveaway" 06 and proceeded to help form
the Coalition for Public Rights in Broadcasting, an umbrella or-
ganization consisting of such diverse groups as the National Organ-
ization for Women, Ralph Nader's Congress Watch, the Consumer
Federation of America, and the Friends of the Earth. In addition,
five labor unions (the National Education Association, the Ameri-
can Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the
United Steelworkers, the Screen Actors Guild, and the United
Auto Workers) and the Coalition of American Public Employees
joined together to form an ad hoc committee to oppose H.R. 3333
and the two Senate bills. Van Deerlin reacted angrily to citizens
movement opposition: "I am a member of what is probably the
oldest public interest group in this country-the Congress. Unlike
the Ralph Naders and Nick Johnsons, members of Congress are
elected-chosen by the people-to represent them."' 0 7 However,
the lobbying served to convince some members of the Subcommit-
105. TELEVISION DIGEST, May 7, 1979, at 2.
106. TELEVISION DIGEST, Apr. 2, 1972, at 5.
107. RADIO & RECORDS, June 15, 1979, at 4.
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tee of the need to adopt a narrower approach. Following Nicholas
Johnson's testimony, Representative Marc Marks (R-Pa.) said:
"There are some of us on this subcommittee who . . . are going to
see that this point of view you've just taken is well represented.""
The cable industry regarded H.R. 3333 as a measure that jeop-
ardized its continued existence. NCTA President Robert Schmidt
said that H.R. 3333's requirement that cable operators obtain per-
mission from broadcasters or program producers to use their pro-
grams is like putting "the fox in charge of the chicken coop." 1" He
also attacked the bill for opening cable to domination by telephone
monopolies.110 Ralph Baruch, chairman and chief executive of
Viacom International, predicted the program consent requirement
would put cable "out of business," as did Ted Turner, owner of
superstation WTBS (TV), Atlanta, who said it would "stop cable
dead.""' Stephen Effros, representing the Community Antenna
Television Association, said that the paperwork alone attached to
program consent would bankrupt small cable systems."' Van Deer-
lin made a number of appearances before cable groups to gain
their support but was not able to convince them that the benefits
of cable deregulation far outweighed the bill's trade-off. In exas-
peration, he told the NCTA: "If the song needed a title it would
have to be 'Please Fence Me In.' And each refrain is the same, too.
It goes, 'All I want is a Fair Advantage.' """
Broadcasters found H.R. 3333 to be considerably more attractive
than H.R. 13015. The NAB, the Association for Maximum Service
Telecasters, and ABC continued to oppose the rewrite concept,
preferring selective amendments to the Communications Act. NAB
generally supported most of the bill but strongly objected to the
trade-off of a spectrum fee. Van Deerlin responded by saying that
there would not be any legislation without a spectrum fee." Van
Deerlin warned broadcasters that if they were uncooperative he
would delete the broadcasting provisions from the bill. He said
108. BROADCASTING, May 21, 1979, at 32.
109. Rewriting II More Radical Than Its Predecessor, BROADCASTING, Apr. 2, 1979, at 29.
110. Id.
111. Id. -
112. Id.
113. Rewrite on Reef?, TELEVISION DIGEST, May 28, 1979, at 1.
114. Van Deerlin, To Broadcasters: Get on Board or be Left Behind, BROADCASTING, May
21, 1979, at 33. Citizens groups were also opposed to a spectrum fee as a trade-off for der-
egulation. Ralph Jennings of the Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ
said: "It is difficult to imagine a spectrum use.fee large enough to offset the loss of respon-
sive local programming." All This Rewrite Talk, BROADCASTING, May 28, 1979, at 67-68.
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broadcasters were not in as strong a bargaining position as they
were under H.R. 13015 because of two factors: "there are a dozen
citizens groups looking at the bill," and AT&T was willing to work
with the Subcommittee."'
Perhaps the most significant obstacles to passage of the bill were
placed by Van Deerlin's colleague in the House, Congressman Col-
lins. Moments after Van Deerlin declared H.R. 3333's public
broadcasting provisions to be "an integral and essential part of the
whole," Collins told a National Public Radio Conference that pub-
lic broadcasting should be cut out of the bill."' Representative Al
Ullman (D-Ore.), Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee,
asked the Speaker of the House to refer H.R. 3333 to his Commit-
tee on the grounds that the fees were really a revenue-raising de-
vice." 7 The trade press reported that deep divisions were becoming
apparent among members of the Subcommittee. A major critic and
opponent of the bill was Subcommittee member Wirth, who was
trying to establish himself (ultimately successfully) as the logical
successor to Van Deerlin. Several of the younger Democrats on the
Subcommittee-Wirth, Swift, Gore and Markey-were opposed to
the deregulation of broadcasting proposed in H.R. 3333.118 During
the July 4th recess, members of the Subcommittee were visited by
broadcasters, cable operators, and the newly formed citizens-labor
lobby urging resistance to the rewrite.
When Van Deerlin presided at the first of two mark-up sessions
in July, it became apparent to him that his colleagues would not
support the "basement-to-attic" rewrite approach. On Friday, July
13th, a letter signed by Van Deerlin, Broyhill, and Collins was sent
to Subcommittee members announcing that the rewrite bill was
dead:
First, most members of the Subcommittee feel more comfortable
proceeding with the 1934 Act as a vehicle for implementing
change. Second, it is clear that telecommunications carrier issues
are the ones on which immediate action is imperative. This is a
position shared by the Senate leadership, the administration, the
Federal Communications Commission, the private industries in-
volved, and labor and consumer groups."'
115. Id.
116. Contrary Collins, BROADCASTING, March 28, 1979, at 70.
117. Spectrum Fee Running Into Housemanship, VARIETY, May 16, 1979, at 87.
118. Cushman, The End of an Era, Throwing in the Rewrite Towel, CABLEVISION, July 30,
1979, at 12.
119. Rewrite Written Off, BROADCASTING, July 16, 1979, at 24.
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Variety began its obituary of H.R. 3333 with this observation:
"Following two years of debate, 95 days of public hearings and tes-
timony from more than 1,200 witnesses, Rep. Van Deerlin has con-
ceded the obvious-that there is insufficient support in his House
Communications Subcommittee to approve the controversial re-
write of the 1934 Communications Act."2 0 Van Deerlin blamed his
own shortcomings for the defeat of H.R. 3333, saying he had writ-
ten a bill in which "everybody found something to dislike,"12 ' and
admitting, "I probably didn't lead as strongly as I should have."1 22
Van Deerlin believed that another problem stood in the way of
his securing support: members of his Subcommittee were "spread
thin" and did not have sufficient time to study the issues."' He
also noted the common ground shared by broadcasters and citizens
groups in lobbying against the bill: "With the ABC Network com-
ing down on the same side as Ralph Nader, it was hard [for Sub-
committee members] to back."12 4 He said that he had always con-
sidered the provisions relating to the telephone companies as the
most important part of the bill, and indeed, on December 13, 1979,
following the demise of H.R. 3333, all of the members of the Sub-
committee on Communications co-sponsored H.R. 6121, a bill con-
taining many of the same common carrier provisions as H.R. 3333.
Van Deerlin later said that he would have preferred to include in
H.R. 6121 a provision aimed at providing rural areas with cable
coverage, but recognized that "pretty soon we'd be bogged down
and we wouldn't get any legislation." He concluded, "We could see
that would start the dominoes-[Motion Picture Association of
America President] Jack Valenti and retransmission consent, then
the NAB. Unlike Vietnam, there is no light at the end of that
tunnel.""
Van Deerlin, in a speech before the International Radio and
Televison Society in September 1979, told broadcasters to "cancel
the wake" for the rewrite. "I wouldn't be running for re-election
120. Reality Catches Up with Van Deerlin, Variety, July 19, 1979, at 29.
121. Rewrite II Dead-Amendments Next, TELEVISION DIGEST, July 16, 1979, at 1.
122. Rewrite Written Off, BROADCASTING, supra note 119, at 24. Van Deerlin, according to
some Capitol Hill observers, employed "old school" leadership-asking members to support
the bill because he was Chairman of the Subcommittee. However, many of the Democratic
members of the Subcommittee were in the Watergate class-elected in 1974-and were un-
willing to support the bill merely because of its sponsorship by Van Deerlin.
123. Sarasohn, Van Deerlin Drops Plans for Comprehensive Rewrite of 1934 Communi-
cations Act, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY 1444 (1979).
124. Id.
125. Cable Out of House Bill, TELEvISION DIGEST, December 17, 1979, at 5.
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next year if I believed the rewrite were dead. Our work will con-
tinue.""12 However, in an article he wrote several months later, he
stated: "There is no 'Rewrite III' nor any plans for one."12 7 The
issue of whether Van Deerlin would pursue the rewrite issue, how-
ever, was definitely decided by the fall Congressional elections. Cu-
riously, the rewrite legislation was a factor determining Van Deer-
lin's future in the election. Voters were said to have felt that he
spent too much time on the rewrite at the expense of local needs,
and perceived him as ineffective because the rewrite efforts had
failed."12 His opponent made a last-minute mailing to voters, sug-
gesting that their telephone bills would increase five-fold if H.R.
6121 were enacted.'29 For whatever reason, he did lose his House
seat in the 1980 Republican sweep, and with his defeat went the
hopes of those who had felt that a fundamental recasting of the
nation's communications law was needed.
While Van Deerlin's rewrite effort ultimately failed as a piece of
legislation, the introduction of the several measures and the debate
they elicited did have a significant impact on communications pol-
icy decisions. First, there was improved Congressional oversight of
the FCC's actions. Along these lines, FCC Commissioner Glen
Robinson observed: "As part of a studied effort over the last two
years to review and revise the entire legislative mandate of the
FCC, the Subcommittee on Communications and its staff have
shown greater attentiveness to, and more understanding of, impor-
tant policy issues than has been evident for at least twenty years
. . ." Former FCC General Counsel Robert Bruce regarded the
"rewrite process" as having "an enormous impact" on the develop-
ment of substantive policies by the Commission: "The Commis-
sioners and staff were asked by Van Deerlin to respond .to sweep-
ing across-the-board proposals for overhaul of the Communications
Act, and had to develop a coherent agency point of view in a very
concentrated period of time."i"
Second, the FCC was spurred to action by rewrite proposals that
126. Van Deerlin Refuses to Say Die, BROADCASTING, September 17, 1979, at 27.
127. Van Deerlin, Progress Made Via 'Rewrite' Dialog, Variety, January 9, 1980, at 213.
128. New Names on Hill, TELEVISION DIGEST, November 10, 1980, at 4. Television Digest
had carried a story the week before the election stating that "Van Deerlin does not face [a]
serious reelection threat." TELEVISION DIGEST, October 27, 1980, at 4.
129. Id.
130. Robinson, The Federal Communications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory
Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REV. 172 (1978).
131. Interview with Robert Bruce, Washington, D.C. (July 8, 1981).
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threatened the very survival of the agency. By taking actions ad-
ministratively that implemented the rewrite's legislative goals of
deregulation and increased marketplace competition, the Commis-
sion took some of the steam out of the drive for legislation and
established the agency in a leadership role. The Commission
adopted major decisions on deregulation of radio and cable televi-
sion (eliminating rules governing the importation of distant signals
and exclusivity protection for syndicated television programs) and
the licensing of earth stations. The FCC took several bold initia-
tives in providing for open entry and deregulation in the common
carrier industry, including extensive deregulation designed to en-
hance competition in the international record carrier industry (the
companies that transmit messages by cable and satellite overseas),
deregulation of terminal equipment (from Princess telephones to
teletype terminals), continued regulation of such "basic" communi-
cations services as traditional transmission and switching while
deregulating "enhanced" services (for example, a service that
might translate the impulses of a computer speaking one language
into another computer language), and reduction of rate regulation
for all but dominant carriers (for example, this would include both
those who resell WATS and private line services on lines leased
from the telephone company and use them to carry high volume
communications between major cities, and non-dominant carriers
who compete with dominant carriers by means of their own micro-
wave systems).' 3
With respect to the provision of new broadcasting outlets, the
FCC proposed the reduction of AM channel spacing from ten to
nine kilohertz, the dropping in of four VHF television channels,
the creation of a new low power television service, the authoriza-
tion of a direct-to-home satellite broadcast service, and the liberal-
ization of FM allocations rules. Thus, except for repeal of Section
315 and the Fairness Doctrine (actions requiring the passage of
legislation), Van Deerlin prodded the FCC into implementing vir-
tually all of the substantive goals discussed earlier in this article.
In the eyes of Van Deerlin and many other Washington observers,
the FCC's bold actions "would have been impossible without the
thunder and lightning sparked by those first two comprehensive
bills." 33
132. For a discussion of these common carrier decisions, see Brenner, Communications
Regulation in the Eighties: The Vanishing Drawbridge, 33 AD. L. REV. at 255, (1981).
133. Van Deerlin, Progress Made Via 'Rewrite' Dialog, Variety, supra note 127, at 213.
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Third, and in the opinion of Van Deerlin most significant,"" the
rewrite process served to derail the Bell Bill, a measure sponsored
in 1976 by 175 Representatives and 17 Senators, by refocusing the
debate on common carrier issues. By sweeping the common carrier
issues together with broadcasting and cable, the legislative issues
were made much more complex-and the process much more
drawn out. Both Van Deerlin and Frey believe that their efforts to
rewrite the Act had an impact on AT&T's basic approach to com-
munications issues.188 In contrast to the more truculent approach
taken in 1976 by AT&T's Chairman John deButts, his successor
Charles L. Brown announced that he intended to be guided by "a
new realism" which recognizes that "competition is a fact of life in
our business.""
Largely because of Van Deerlin's efforts, communications issues
have taken on a new importance in Congress and the White House.
He has laid the groundwork for legislative overhaul of the Commu-
nications Act upon which the more conservative 97th Congress can
build. Perhaps the true legacy of rewrite-and a very important
one-was best expressed by Van Deerlin:
The rewrite is generating a new environment in Washington-an
environment in which the old laws and established institutions
are being challenged by the skepticism of new players in a new
era. As a long-time observer and participant, I tell you this: things
will never be the same again."
134. Interview with Lionel Van Deerlin, Washington, D.C. (July 7, 1981).
135. Id.
136. Congress is Moving to Inject Competition into Long Distance Communications,
Wall St. J., February 6, 1980, at 48. Unlike deButts, who was an advocate of the Bell Bill,
Brown espoused a new AT&T philosophy accomodating competition and new technology.
Although H.R. 6121 reversed the principal elements of the Bell Bill, AT&T supported the
bill. Ironically, AT&T's competitors also changed their position. While they had generally
supported H.R. 13015, they condemned H.R. 6121 in the harshest terms-calling it a Bell
Bill. Interview with Charles Jackson (former staff engineer, House Communications Sub-
committee), Washington, D.C. (July 20, 1981). But see Schwartz, Stacked Competition and
Phony Deregulation for AT&T: The Proposed Telecommunications Competition and De-
regulation Act of 1981, 3 Comu/ENT L.J. (1981).
137. Van Deerlin Refuses to Say Die, BROADCASTING, supra note 126, at 28.
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